1Q 2026
The following is an excerpt of the Supply section of the Global LNG Outlook.
Following the supply disruptions caused by the March 2026 Middle East war, Poten now projects a tight LNG supply market in 2026, 2027, 2028 and potentially for the remainder of this decade. This is primarily driven by the ongoing shutdowns and damage to Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG infrastructure, and the de-facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz to ship traffic. The war also impacted production at ADNOC’s AdGas facilities in the UAE and disrupted the construction of all the Qatari mega-trains (NFE, NFS, NFW) and the UAE’s Ruwais LNG.
The disruption to Qatar’s 80 MMt/y LNG capacity was driven initially by precautionary shutdowns following the Strait of Hormuz closure, which led to storage tank-tops risk. However, subsequent direct damage from missile strikes on Ras Laffan further compromised the situation.
The overall impact of the outage depends heavily on the duration of the conflict. Given the scale of Qatari supply, lost volumes cannot be materially offset by existing projects in other regions within the required timeframe. Over the longer term, a prolonged conflict could also delay the commissioning of eight under-construction mega-train expansions, further postponing new capacity.
Outside the Middle East, LNG project development continues to progress. The start-up of the Nguya FLNG project in the Republic of the Congo increases the country’s LNG production capacity to approximately 3 MMt/y.
In the US, Venture Global LNG’s Calcasieu Pass 2 (CP2) Phase 2 achieved FID in March, adding 5.6 MMt/y and bringing the project’s total nameplate capacity to around 20 MMt/y. In addition, Venture Global’s operating projects, Calcasieu Pass and Plaquemines, are currently producing above nameplate capacity, providing incremental supply into an already tight market.
Despite near-term supply tightness and the risk of deficits, Poten continues to project robust long-term LNG demand growth, reaching over 590 MMt/y by 2030 and 655 MMt/y by 2036.
Near-Term Outlook
On March 2nd, the US and Isreal attacked Iran with an extensive air bombing campaign. In retaliation, Iranian drone and missile strikes targeted Gulf countries hosting US military bases, including Qatar. Iran also announced the de-facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz following the military attacks. As a result, QatarEnergy suspended LNG production and declared force majeure on shipments. The shutdown of 80 MMt/y of operating Qatari LNG capacity creates a significant global supply shortfall, with impacts intensifying the longer the outage persists. In addition, LNG trains require a controlled cool-down and restart process, meaning extended downtime would lengthen the ramp-up period back to full operations. The disruption is also expected to delay the start-up of the North Field Expansion, where eight mega-trains of 8 MMt/y each could face construction and commissioning delays, further prolonging supply tightness.
In the same region, ADNOC’s ADGAS LNG in Abu Dhabi has also been shut down following drone attacks and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The loss of around 5.7 MMt/y of LNG production further exacerbates the global supply shortfall, intensifying the impact of disruptions in Qatar. Although smaller in scale, the ADGAS outage removes an additional source of Middle Eastern LNG supply, tightening prompt market availability. As with Qatar, the duration of the outage will be a key determinant of market impact, with prolonged disruptions contributing to sustained supply tightness.
The situation became even more dire following the March 18th Israel attack on the South Pars gas field in Iran. Iran retaliated against Israel’s attack by hitting Qatar’s Ras Laffan energy complex. According to QatarEnergy, two LNG trains and one GTL facility sustained direct hits. From the descriptions provided so far, we believe the LNG trains are one 4.7 MMt/y in the original RasGas complex, and one of the more modern 7.8 MMt/y mega-trains also at RasGas. This brings the total capacity directly offline because of the missile hits to 12.5 MMt/y.
This led to even further repercussions to our balancing of supply and demand and global view. This remains a moving target and depends on largely on conflict duration and impacts – all of the below discussion is based on wide ranging assumptions. In addition to the previous adjustments made because of the precautionary trains’ shutdown by QatarEnergy, the balances reflect the following changes: The forecast has taken the two RasGas trains directly damaged by the attack out of production for the remainder of 2026, as well as 2027 and half of 2028. This thus assumes around two years of shutdown, including remobilization and repairs. When they do start in mid-2028, the forecast assumes they would ramp up over a period of around 4 months.
Long Term Impact
Given the war trajectory, and the continued shutdown to the LNG facilities at Ras Laffan, the forecast assumes that the entire LNG production (including the trains that were not directly hit by the Iranian attack) to be down for the next 4 months or so (basically this assumes the conflict would be over in about 4 months from now and no additional direct hits to Ras Laffan), then trains (the ones not impacted by the missile strikes) would restart and ramp up for around an additional 4 months. So, under these scenarios, they would be back at nameplate by the end of 2026.
The forecast had already delayed the mega-trains currently under construction by around 6 months pre-Iran direct hit at RasGas. Because of the deteriorating situation and the evacuation of labor force/EPC, and the need to re-mobilize, the forecast added four months (so now close to 10 months delays per train is assumed).
These adjustments generated a massive 42 MMt/y drop in LNG supply in 2026, and around 15 to 18 MMt/y in 2027-2028. The market would only rebalance in 2030 as US production ramps up aggressively, and Qatar reached pre-war production level.
Given we were already maxed out as far as the addition of supply from other countries, we had to further (and drastically) reduce the LNG demand of many (if not all) LNG importing countries. Of course, the ones more directly impacted by the loss of the Qatari volumes saw aggressive further reductions (including Bangladesh, Thailand, Pakistan, Taiwan, India, etc.). Some in Europe as well (including Belgium and Italy). South America would be challenged as well by high prices.
This excerpt is taken from Poten’s Global LNG Outlook. Complete the form below to learn more or request a trial.